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Introduction 
 
The idea that China, once the center of world revolutionary passion, should lead 
global capitalism is as unexpected as it is ironic. But the emergence of the 
transnational capitalist class (TCC) has promoted a multi-centric world order where 
“everything solid melts into air.” Disappearing is the dominant position of the US, 
further undercut by the erratic nationalism of President Trump. With the US acting 
as if globalization is the unwanted step-child of its hegemonic power, the 
guardianship of transnational capital has fallen to the Chinese. 
  Under the tutelage of Deng Xiaoping, China became a vessel for foreign direct 
investment becoming the manufacturing workshop of the world. The Communist 
Party (CCP) leadership adopted the view that modernization and development 
could only take place if China integrated with global markets. As foreign capital 
flooded into the coast, land reform sent millions of former socialist peasants to work 
in the world’s sweatshops. Under Jiang Zemin further reforms shut thousands of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulting in 30 million unemployed workers now 
ready for employment at FoxCom, Honda, and Walmart. Consequently, under state 
engineering manufacturing and finance began to merge with transnational capital, 
creating a private sector capitalist class, as well as a statist transnational capitalist 
class. 
  The Chinese TCC has been cautious in taking on the role of world leadership. 
But as China grew to the second largest world economy the CCP wanted to step-up 
the value chain ladder, develop a consumer middle class, and take the lead in key 
technologies such as robots, electric cars, green energy, and semi-conductors. With 
capital accumulation bulging out of the pockets of state banks and their sovereign 
wealth fund, President Xi’s call for “outward bound” investments opened a new 
door for accumulation. No longer would China simply be a platform for foreign 
investments, but a global power taking the lead on foreign direct investments (FDI), 
and sending their capital into the markets of the world. China also faced the problem 
of saturated home markets, typical of developed capitalist economies. With a 
massive infrastructure nearly completed, the need for steel, cement, coal, and other 
basic industrial goods has shrunk, and the giants of manufacturing now 
overproduce their once sought after commodities. Turning abroad responds to their 
need for growth and accumulation. 
  All this comes along at a time of US retreats, not of the US TCC, but in terms 
of state political leadership. With TCC hegemony taking hold in the 1980s neo-
liberal policies enforced austerity for the working class, while the rich got ever 
more. Ripping apart of the New Deal safety net in the US, the Keynesian social 
compromise in Europe and the Iron Rice Bowl in China, the TCC have seen their 
wealth and power expand like an exploding sun. A populist political reaction has 
been slowly boiling underneath, taking both right and left forms. In the US this was 
represented by the Bernie Sanders campaign, as well as Trump. 
  The problem confronting the TCC is maintaining political legitimacy for their 
rule. Unlike the major hegemonic blocs of the twentieth century, Keynesianism, 
Communism, and Fascism, neo-liberal globalization lacks a mass social base 
outside its elite consensus and limited middle-class support. Although transnational 
hegemony consolidated, it still has to constantly battle the remaining relationships, 
ideology, and culture of the nation-centric international system. As Karl Marx 
wrote: 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And 
just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, 
creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order 
to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and 
borrowed language.1 
 
  Marx’s insights are relevant today, where the central contradiction is the 
struggle between the nation-centric system with its Keynesian social contract, and 
transnational capitalism with its neo-liberal rearrangement of society. The TCC 
works to reengineer governance, economic institutions, culture, and ideology, but 
“under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” The 
new order is in constant conflict with the old, which struggles to reassert itself to 
define the future. Never developing a large and mobilized social base neo-liberal 
globalization has been open to political challenges. Such challenges intensify as the 
environmental crisis unfolds, and the economic crisis continues to produce greater 
inequality. Global capitalism is ever evolving under such pressure. Responding to 
nation-centric challenges the TCC will use nationalist “battle slogans, 
costumes…and borrowed language” to disguise globalization. And so we get 
Donald Trump. 
  State actors are at the spear point of this contradiction. On the one hand they 
pass law after law pushing neo-liberal reforms, and promote regulations that expand 
and protect TCC economic imperatives. On the other hand they must protect 
political legitimacy for the system, and contend with all the old relationships from 
the past Keynesian hegemonic bloc and nationalist orientation. This creates space 
                                                          
1 See https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/114782-men-make-their-own-history-but-they-do-not-
make. 
for oppositional political movements to win concessions when the political balance 
of forces move in their direction. 
  Trump seized upon this space to “conjure up the spirits of the past” with his 
“Make America Great Again” campaign. Cloaking the true character of his regime 
Trump uses the “battle slogans” and “borrowed language” of nationalism, while 
surrounding himself with globalist elites from Wall Street. The TCC remain in 
Trump’s power bloc, but in an uncomfortable and unstable alliance with the alt-
right and Christian fundamentalists.2 Financial elites salivate over the promise of 
lower taxes and repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act. Nonetheless, from time-to-time the 
nationalist beast must be fed. The TCC now has a mass base, but one they don’t 
really want. The major concession was dropping out of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, but both the Republicans and Democrats realized they couldn’t afford 
to push it any further. Withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement wasn't so 
much an act of nationalism, as a gift to Trump’s fossil fuel friends who are a major 
part of the TCC sector. What is left is faux-populism and attacks against 
immigrants, Muslims, and appeals to racial divisions. His erratic personal style, his 
need to compromise with nationalist demands, and the influence of the alt-right in 
his administration has resulted in a steep loss of US influence around the world. 
But the debilitating wars in the Middle East and the turtle pace recovery from the 
2007 crash had undermined US leadership well before Trump ever entered the 
White House. 
 Trump's power bloc is far from a new hegemonic bloc that unites all sectors 
of the capitalist class behind a dominant ideology and political project. The neo-
Keynesian TCC are a solid opposition within the Democratic Party. Green 
capitalists that span the political spectrum have a different strategic vision based in 
market environmentalism. And Trump has alienated even those TCC 
representatives who were willing to work on various high profile corporate 
committees.  
 But splits within the TCC have been evident ever since the 1997 Asian 
crash.3 The social fallout from that crisis caused some major economists, such as 
Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, to move to the left and break with neo-
liberalism. Centrists such as Lawrence Summers and Christine Lagarde began to 
call for structural restraints on widely speculative capital, and now talk of "inclusive 
capitalism."  But still a large section of the TCC, mainly based in finance, remain 
committed to the most extreme forms of neo-liberal austerity and maximum 
freedom for the movement of capital. George Soros has labeled this fraction 
"market fundamentalist," and this sector forms a key pillar in Trump's power bloc.  
                                                          
2 Harris, Jerry, Davidson, Carl, Fletcher Jr., Bill, and Harris, Paul. (2017). “Trump and American 
Fascism.” International Critical Thought. 
3 Robinson, William,  Harris, Jerry. (2000). "Towards a Global Ruling Class: globalization and the 
Transnational Capitalist Class." Science and Society, Vol. 64, NO. 1. Pp. 11-54. 
 Trump's policies are an attempt to re-implement the Washington Consensus 
in its most fundamentalist neo-liberal form. These include major tax breaks for the 
rich, attacks on labor and social services, deregulation of finance and energy, 
privatization of the infrastructure, and charter schools to undermine public 
education. All of these are cherished goals of the original TCC project as it emerged 
under Reagan and Thatcher, and were consistently pursued at the WTO and IMF. 
Trump's cabinet is a shrewdly built alliance between market fundamentalist and the 
theocratic Right, with major economic and commerce positions given to the TCC, 
and positions over social issues conceded to the reactionary Christian wing of the 
Republican Party. From the TCC we have CEO Rex Tillerson from Exxon-Mobile 
as Secretary of State, billionaire and former Goldman Sachs partner Steven 
Mnuchin at Treasury, president of Goldman Sachs Gary Cohn as head of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, Scott Pruitt representing the fossil fuel TCC at the 
EPA, and private equity billionaire Wilbur Ross as Commerce Secretary.  On the 
theocratic Right we have Vice-President Pence, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, 
Housing and Urban Development under Ben Carson, Tom Price as (ex)Secretary 
of Health and Human Services, and Betsy DeVos at the Department of Education.  
 Trump himself is deeply involved in transnational capitalism with 
investments in twenty countries including: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bermuda, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Dominican Republic, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Panama, 
Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, St. Martin, South Korea, Turkey, the 
UAE, and Uruguay. All these investments and deals create deep ties to the TCC in 
both the global north and south. 
 The problem for TCC market fundamentalists is that Trump's victory 
brought to power the nationalist, racist base that had been growing inside the 
Republican Party ever since Nixon's Southern strategy. Although losing their 
presidential campaigns, John McCain and Mitt Romney had kept this base in check 
and continued TCC leadership within the party. But Trump's victory shifted the 
power bloc. To win the White House the populist right-wing base had to be fully 
unleashed, and now concessions have to be made. Consequently Trump's continual 
racist, confrontational, and nationalist tweets and rallies contradict the multicultural 
and cosmopolitan culture necessary for globalization. This continual tension in the 
ruling power bloc undermines TCC hegemony to the point that space has opened 
for alternative global leadership to oversee the institutional governance structures 
of global capitalism.  
 The US and the UK were the first countries where the TCC applied neo-
liberalism in its most naked form under Reagan and Thatcher. Deindustrialization 
and attacks on the social contract were deep and broad, and the hegemonic position 
of finance capital strong. It’s no wonder that populous reactions undercutting the 
legitimacy of TCC political rule would explode in the most disruptive manner, 
having greater ramifications than those in other EU countries, Canada, or Australia. 
On basic transnational economic questions the US and UK constituted a core TCC 
alliance that provided stable global governance. With the largest financial centers 
in the world situated in London and New York, powerful fossil fuel interests in both 
countries, imperialist militaries, and long historic ties the UK and US TCC factions 
had enormous influence on structuring transnational state institutions, trade pacts, 
and neo-liberal social policies. Now the weakened position of the US/UK TCC as 
consequence of the Brexit vote, Jeremy Corbyn, Donald Trump, and Bernie 
Sanders has resulted in a necessary retreat from leadership. Political elites 
representing their interests are having considerable difficulty using their national 
state apparatus to control global governance. The balance of forces have changed. 
Under these circumstances the Chinese state TCC has stepped into the void, 
emerging to take a stronger role in promoting and organizing the global capitalist 
economy. 
  Transnational corporations (TNCs) are largely free of having to maintain 
political legitimacy. Although viewed with mistrust and anger by the working class, 
TNCs pursue their economic goals relying on their political representatives to deal 
with populous outrage. We can compare the decline of the US to the rise of China, 
but we need to keep in mind that the TCC is integrated when it comes to 
manufacturing and finance. Nevertheless, state political actors and transnational 
bureaucrats can represent different visions over how globalization should be carried 
out as a result of historic differences and inherited inequalities. This is particularly 
sharp when it comes to China and other TCC factions from the global South. 
Consequently, the US "empire" under Trump is a complex mix of TCC integration, 
competition over transnational governance structures, overlaid with concessions to 
a nationalist base. Nevertheless, the overall project of a borderless free world for 
global capitalism remains the constant for all TCC fractions. Between 2001 and 
2015 there have been 1,536 changes in national investment laws covering hundreds 
of countries. Of those, 1,202 have liberalized policies opening up borders to greater 
flows of transnational capital. China has been no exception. The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that: “China and 
India—were the most active in opening up various industries to foreign investors.”4 
(italicized in the original) 
 
Chinese and US Investments 
 
Some basic statistics reveal the immense size of the integrated globalized economy. 
In 2016 the inward stock of FDI totaled $27 trillion;5 foreign affiliates of TNCs had 
                                                          
4 UNCTAD. (2016). World Investment Report 2016. UN Publications Geneva. Pp. 104-105. 
5 UNCTAD. (2017). World Investment Report 2017. UN Publications Geneva. Pg. 26 
total assets of $113 trillion, sales of $38 trillion, value added of $8 trillion, exports 
of $7 trillion, and employment of 82 million workers.6 
  In 2016 among the 100 largest, non-financial TNCs foreign assets made up 62 
percent of their total assets, 64 percent of their total sales, and 57 percent of their 
total employment.7 With such deeply integrated cross-border activity assigning 
strict national identities results in a false picture of how global capitalism functions. 
Immersion in transnational circuits of accumulation is the key characteristic that 
defines the dominant sector of the capitalist class. And when it comes to moving 
money offshore the Chinese TCC is no different from other factions. Between 
2010-2014 Chinese and Hong Kong capitalists moved $193 billion into the British 
Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands, 43 percent of the total during those years.8 
  State-owned enterprises dominate significant sections of the Chinese 
economy. And many of these SOEs have a huge global footprint. China has nine of 
the world’s 13 largest financial SOEs. Financial institutions are the heart of global 
capitalism, taking in and pumping out investments through the veins of worldwide 
accumulation. From a nation-centric viewpoint these would appear to be national 
champions in competition with US, Japanese, EU, and other national corporations. 
But when we view the actual percent of Chinese state ownership the role of 
transnational capital becomes apparent. 
 
Table 1: China’s Largest State Financial Institutions9 
 
SOE & World Rank 
State 
Ownership 
(%) 
Assets  
(US trillions) 
Employment 
#1. Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 34.6 3.4 433,346 
#2. China Construction Bank Corp 57.0 2.8 369,183 
#3. Agricultural Bank of China Ltd 40.0 2.7 503,082 
#5. Bank of China 64.0 2.6 310,042 
#6. Bank of Communications 26.5 1.1 89,269 
#8. China Merchants Bank 26.8 0.843 31,120 
#9. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 20.0 0.777 48,427 
#10. Ping An Insurance 32.2 0.734 300,000 
#13. China Life Insurance 100.0 0.466 98,823 
 
  Chinese SOEs have accepted investments from global financial institutions as 
a means to integrate with the TCC. BlackRock as the largest investment firm in the 
                                                          
6 Ibid. Table 1.4 
7 UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2017. UN Publications Geneva. Pg. 29, Table 1.5. 
8 UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2016. UN Publications Geneva. Pg. 34, Figure 1.22. 
9 UNCTAD. (2017). World Investment Report 2017. UN Publications Geneva. Pg. 34, Table 1.7. 
world is a good example. BlackRock has investments that include: Bank of China, 
ICBC, China Construction Bank, China Life Insurance, China Pacific Insurance, 
CITIC, SINOPEC, PetroChina, China Railway Construction Corporation, China 
Rail Engineering General Corporation, China Telecommunications, and China 
Communications Construction Corporation. Other financial institutions with 
similar investments include: Fidelity, HSBC, JP Morgan, State Street, Vanguard, 
UBS, Invesco, Barclays, Deutsch Bank, BNP Paribas, and many others. Such 
investments create a web of common interests among different sections of the 
TCC.10 So for example, when China Communications Construction Corporation 
builds a port in Brazil its transnational investors also profit. The same is true when 
ICBC provides Petrobras and Vale with $6 billion in loans, or the Bank of China 
sends $480 million to Ecuador, a percent of the interest payments flow to 
BlackRock and other financial TNCs. 
  Significant amounts of capital have moved in the opposite direction as well, 
from China to the US. CIC, China’s $300 billion sovereign wealth fund has invested 
in the following US companies: AIG, Apple, Bank of America, Blackstone, 
Citigroup, Coca-Cola, Johnson & Johnson, Morgan Stanley, Motorola, News Corp, 
and Visa. Overall CIC has equity stakes in more than 60 US corporations.11 As of 
2016 Chinese SOEs and private TNCs had invested $109 billion in the US. The 
three largest areas of investments were energy, information communication 
technology, and real estate and hospitality. 
  But these are not strictly “Chinese” investments, since US and other foreign 
investors hold stock in these TNCs. A good example is Shuanghui's $4.7 billion 
acquisition of Smithfield Foods. US private equity firm CDH holds 34 percent of 
Shuanghui’s stock, Goldman Sachs five percent, and three percent is held by 
Tamasek, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund. The Chinese private equity 
corporation New Horizon Capital also has five percent, but their partners are 
Tamasek and SBI Group from Japan. The acquisition was arranged by an offshore 
entity in the Cayman Islands, set-up by Shuanghui with help from Morgan 
Stanley.12 
  To deepen our understanding of the transnational character FDI and foreign 
affiliates we can turn to a study by UNCTAD. The study looked at 4.5 million 
corporations starting from local direct ownership of foreign affiliates, up through 
the hierarchy to ultimate ownership. Such a method considers the growth of 
transnational production, the links between value chains and the integration of the 
                                                          
10 Harris, Jerry. (2016). Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Democracy. Clarity Press, Atlanta. 
11 Harris, Jerry. Edited by Murray, Georgina and Scott, John. (2012). “Outward bound: 
transnational capitalism in China.” In Financial Elites and Transnational Business: Who rules the 
World? Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Cheltenham, UK. Pp. 220-241. 
12 Harris, Jerry. (2016). Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Democracy. Clarity Press. Atlanta, 
Pg. 205. 
world economy, and how all this is reflected in corporate structures. The UNCTAD 
reports that: 
 
Firms, and especially affiliates of multination enterprises (MNEs) are often 
controlled through hierarchical webs of ownership involving a multitude of 
entities. More than 40 per cent of foreign affiliates are owned through 
complex vertical chains with multiple cross-border links involving on 
average three jurisdictions. Corporate nationality, and with it the 
nationality of investors in and owners of foreign affiliates, is becoming 
increasingly blurred.13 
 
   The 100 largest TNCs have an average of 549 affiliates over a network of 56 
countries with 19 holding companies Among these, 52 percent of the foreign 
affiliates had financial institutions as their ultimate owners, 12 percent were owned 
by SOEs, and individuals or families owned 18 percent. The larger the corporation 
the more complex the ownership structure becomes. For example, 53 of the top 100 
have a mismatch between the direct and ultimate ownership of 82 percent.14 
  Mismatch between the direct and ultimate owner can take three basic forms: 
1) domestic direct owner and foreign ultimate owner, 2) foreign direct owner and 
foreign ultimate owner (of different countries), and 3) foreign direct ownership and 
domestic ultimate ownership. Looking at mismatch by industry we see mining with 
57 percent; accommodation and food services 55 percent; electricity 54 percent; 
financial services 49 percent; manufacturing at 47 percent; information and 
communication 40 percent; construction 40 percent; and wholesale and retail at 34 
percent.15 
    
  As UNCTAD explains, 
 
Investor nationality is not what it seems…ownership and control are 
sometimes extremely dispersed—affiliates are owned by direct and indirect 
shareholders within the same MNE spread across on average three 
jurisdictions…even minority ownership stakes can be sufficient to exercise 
control, through the use of cross-shareholdings, preferential shares or 
voting blocs. And there are non-equity forms of control (such as contracts 
and licensing agreements, or control over key inputs, distribution channels, 
brands, patents trademarks, etc.) that cannot be deduced from company 
                                                          
13 UNCTAD. (2017). World Investment Report 2016. UN Publications Geneva. Pg. 138. 
14 Ibid. Pp. 145, 149, 165. 
15 Ibid. Pg. 171. 
shareholder registers and often remain indivisible to investment authorities 
and regulators.16 
 
  Consequently, when looking at national figures we need to remember FDI 
most often consist of a consortium of global investors, although notated by the 
national identity of the lead TNC. National competition occurs, but the character of 
that competition is over constructing the institutions of a common global project, 
not competition between opposing national economies. All states under the 
hegemony of the TCC see globalization and national development as strategically 
linked, with deeper transnational integration as their common goal. But state actors, 
often driven by internal political pressure, may clash over leadership roles in 
transnational governance and economic institutions. In other words, the 
transnational state is an arena for competition, just like ruling class conflicts over 
the political direction of national states since the inception of the system. Other 
important actors are elite think tanks that bring together business, political and 
cultural elites from different countries.17 Such think tanks develop strategic policies 
based on their political/economic views on questions of transnational importance, 
not on nation-centric concerns, Therefore, it's important to understand the 
difference between competition over global governance, and those over market 
rivalries that mainly exist between different blocks of TNCs consisting of a variety 
of national investors. 
  This applies to US and Chinese statistical data. What we see is the leading role 
of Chinese and US corporations in organizing global capital, rather than direct 
national competition. At the end of 2016 China’s outbound capital ranked number 
two, just behind the US. China and Hong Kong combined for outbound FDI of $245 
billion, and the US registered $299 billion.18 It’s clear that both countries are 
playing a key role in the circulation of global capital. In Table 2 we can see how 
much total stock China and the US holds by region. These figures should reflect 
the advantage of US investments because of the much longer history of FDI by US 
TNCs. Nevertheless, China is rapidly catching up, this is evident in announced 
greenfield investments, which reveal future FDI in new infrastructure, mining, and 
manufacturing facilities. 
 
                                                          
16 Ibid. Pg. 196. 
17 Carroll, William K. (2010) The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class. Zed Books. London 
and New York.  
18 UNCTAD. (2017). World Investment Report 2017. UN Publications Geneva. Pg. 14, Figure 
1.14. 
Table 2: Chinese and US FDI by Region 
 
Region & Country Year 
Total FDI 
Stock  
(US billions) 
Announced Greenfield 
Development  
(US billions) 
Africa: US19 2015 64 3.6 
Africa: China20 2015 35 36.1 
Asia: US21 2015 533 49.5 
Asia: China22  2015 1.373 44.2 
Latin Am: US23  2016 224 21.6 (includes Canada) 
Latin Am: China24 2016 50 2.7 
Least Developed Countries: 
US25 
2016 7 3.4 
Least Developed Countries: 
China26 
2016 31 14.0 
Transition Economies: US27 2015 10 0.959 
Transition Economies: 
China28 
2015 23 5.1 
 
  Another insight into China’s growing role in global capitalism is their percent 
of total FDI in individual countries. Although just before the big surge of Chinese 
outbound capital, a worldwide study by Gregor Alsch, Josh Keller, and K.K. 
Rebecca Lai over the years 2005-2013 is revealing. Following are some results for 
the proportion of Chinese FDI by region and selected countries (all numbers in 
percent).29 
 
                                                          
19 Ibid. Pp.44-45. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid Pp.49-50. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. Pp. 57-58. 
24 Llorent & Cuenca. (2016). Special Report: China's Contribution to the renewal of the Latin 
American economic model. developing ideas, Madrid. March. 
25 UNCTAD. (2017). World Investment Report 2017. UN Publications Geneva. Pp. 78-79. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. Pp. 64-65. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Alsch, Gregor, Keller, Josh, and Lai, K.K. Rebecca. (2015). “The World According to China.” 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/business/international/the-world-according-to-
china-investment-maps.html. 
Africa: Cameroon 35, Chad 33, Congo 31, Ethiopia 4, Guinea 69, Kenya 
7, Mauritius 21, Mozambique 22, Nigeria 12, Niger 53, South Africa 16, 
Tanzania 19, Uganda 28, Zambia 16, Zimbabwe 82. 
 
Asia: Australia 16, Brunei 39, Cambodia 10, India 1, Indonesia 12, Japan 
3, North Korea 93, South Korea 3, Sri Lanka 27, Vietnam 2. 
 
Eurasia: Tajikistan 22, Kazakhstan 15, Mongolia 11, Russia 4. 
 
Europe: France 3, Greece 20, Germany 1, Portugal 9, UK 2. 
 
Latin America: Argentina 11, Brazil 7, Ecuador 57, Peru 15, Venezuela 
12. 
 
Middle East: Afghanistan 79, Egypt 8, Iran 13, Iraq 38, Pakistan 7, Turkey 
2, Syria 30, Yemen 19. 
 
  What immediately stands out is China’s strong position in Africa. But the big 
surprise is China’s large share of investments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Such 
figures are hard to explain if these wars are understood as efforts to secure an 
exclusive US empire. An alternative explanation is to see US military action as 
attempts to stabilize and secure the Middle East for global capitalism. 
 
The Chinese Path to Leadership 
 
China has taken a number of distinct steps in its emergence as a leader of global 
capitalism. Some of the most significant were the creation of the BRICs bank, the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the promotion of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the strategic economic plan for the One 
Belt One Road (OBOR). 
  The Brics Bank, now known as the New Development Bank (NDB), was first 
proposed by India in 2012. Set up with a reserve of $100 billion, with each member 
(China, Brazil, India, Russian, and South Africa), having equal voting rights. 
Headquartered in Shanghai the bank’s priority has become promoting renewable 
energy. In 2016 seven such projects were approved for $3.6 billion, with all loans 
going to member states. The importance of NDB was underlined by Nobel Prize 
economist Joseph Stiglitz who stated the founding marks a “fundamental change in 
global economic and political power.”30 The NDB was a coming out party for the 
rapidly emerging economies of former colonial countries and socialist states. It was 
                                                          
30 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Development_Bank. 
a statement that globalization was not going to proceed as a Western project, but as 
a transnational endeavor in which new political and economic parity was expected. 
In 2016 the BRICS accounted for 22 percent of the world GDP, and held outward 
stock of $2.1 trillion, or 8 percent of the world’s total. The BRICs also represent a 
strong statist TCC sector. There are close to 1500 state-owned TNCs in the world, 
holding 86,000 foreign affiliates. These include 15 of the top 100 global TNCs. 
Among the BRICs China has 257 state-owned TNCs, India 61, South Africa 55, 
Russia 51, and Brazil 12, all together about 29 percent of the total.31 Although the 
BRIC bank may rebalance some historic disparities between the West and emerging 
Southern economies, it’s a rebalancing of the TCC, not some socialist undermining 
of capitalism. Proposed the same year as the BRICs bank the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was launched at the ASEAN 
Summit in Cambodia as a free-trade zone. With the withdrawal of the US from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the statist TCC from China have touted the RCEP 
alternative with great fanfare. The pact would include 16 members and encompass 
seven of the 12 countries from the failed TPP. These include: Australia, Brunei, 
Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and Vietnam. In addition, when 
visiting Latin America Chinese President Xi Jinping was quick to invite Chile and 
Peru to join. Both countries had been part of the TPP negotiations. As the state-run 
news agency Xinhua declared, Xi is an “ardent champion of globalization.”32 
  At Davos Xi played the role of the newly crowned leader of globalization. 
Newsweek noted, “China could be the most powerful voice heralding the social and 
economic benefits of globalization, inviting countries to join free trade pacts that it 
hosts and organizes, and investing into developing countries to gain market 
access…Clearly, we are living in an upside-down world.”33 World leaders agreed, 
Davos World Economic Forum founder Klaus Schwab said, “In a world marked by 
great uncertainty and volatility the world is looking to China;” and former Swedish 
Primer Carl Bildt added, “There is a vacuum when it comes to global economic 
leadership, and Xi Jinping is clearly aiming to fill it. With some success.”34 
  This was music to the ears of the Chinese TCC. According to He Yafei, Vice 
Minister, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, there is a heated worldwide debate 
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between the “deglobalization” and the “reglobalization” camps. Reglobalization 
lead by China seeks a “convergence,” i.e. “a historical shift from Western 
governance to co-governance by the East and West.” As he explains, 
“Reglobalization does not mean throwing away the current global governance 
system. China has repeatedly expressed its firm position that it wants to safeguard, 
reinforce and reform the existing governance system.”35 
  Xi and the Chinese took a similar stance when the US withdrew from the 
World Climate Change Agreement negotiated in Paris. By affirming Chinese 
commitment Xi seized the reins of leadership from US political elites hampered by 
the Trump administration. Beyond words, China has leapt to the forefront in the 
production of alternative energy. Their investments into solar, wind, and electric 
cars now lead the world. In doing so they have firmly implanted themselves in the 
TCC fraction for which green capitalism is a strategic direction, and which has 
important support within the US and Europe.36 
  The most important initiatives for leadership are the twin projects of the 
OBOR and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
This bank will play a major role in financing China’s OBOR strategy to build a vast 
network of trade spanning Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. The AIIB 
sees its goal as eventually lending up to $1 trillion for building infrastructure to 
accommodate the globalized economy. This is the full integration of the developing 
world into global markets calling for the financing of roads, docks, airports, 
railways, dams, electronic highways and energy production. OBOR offers the most 
expansive vision of global capitalism and its future put forth by any country or 
faction of the TCC. 
  When China first put forth the call to establish the AIIB the Obama 
administration attempted to lead a worldwide boycott. This turned into a political 
rout when countries from every region rushed to join. First to break was the UK, 
their huge transnational financial sector located in London ignoring Washington’s 
boycott. That broke the dam with Germany, France, Italy, and Norway quickly 
following. In Asia most of America’s closest allies rushed to join the pack with 
South Korea and Australia leading the way. When Xi opened the founding 
ceremony 57 countries were present, including India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Israel. Membership is now at 77. Praise rolled in from the IMF, World Bank, 
and European Bank for Reconstruction. Although China retains the largest voting 
share at 26 percent, this is not enough to veto a simple majority, unlike the US veto 
hold over the IMF. Former managing director of the World Bank, Kevin Rafferty 
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stated, “The United States has lost its way and is rapidly forfeiting claims to global 
financial, economic, political and moral leadership.”37 Nevertheless, China has kept 
the door open for US participation. As AIIB President Jin Liqun said, “We have a 
standing invitation” for the US to join the bank.38 
  Beyond infrastructure, OBOR includes eliminating trade barriers, greater 
exploration and extraction of natural resources, stronger financial ties, free-trade 
regions, opening up services in education, culture, and health care, encouraging 
investments in child and elderly care, architecture, accounting and auditing, 
logistics, and e-commerce. Truly a borderless market for global capitalism in 
manufacturing, services and finance. As Wang Min, chairman of one of China’s 
large construction TNCs stated, “‘One Belt, One Road’ makes our 
internationalization strategy like a tiger with wings added.”39 
  The Western TCC has no such alternative vision of development except 
maintaining the present transnational status quo. But their ability to do so is being 
undercut by political disruptions and loss of legitimacy. Consequently, the AIIB 
and OBOR offer vast new markets for growth and accumulation, without which 
global capitalism would enter a climatic crisis. Therefore, the US and Western TCC 
is more than happy to join the project, essentially following Chinese leadership. 
  AIIB loans will be aided by further Chinese loans from CIC, the Export-Import 
Banks, the Bank of China, and other financial institutions. Besides taking part in 
loans and debt activity, transnational corporations will obtain contracts, acquire 
joint ventures, and be active in design, legal, financial and technical consultancies. 
  The Economist Corporate Network has produced a roadmap of infrastructure 
projects that cover 44 of the 68 countries included in the OBOR project.40 Pinsent 
Masons looked at Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe as three representative African 
countries. Their study found 21 on-going developments worth about $21 billion, 
plus another 57 projects in pre-development stage. The key infrastructure project is 
a $14 billion extension of Kenya’s SGR rail line. The first stage is to connect the 
Mombasa sea port to Nairobi, and then onto Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan. 
The China Export Import Bank has extended loans for the first leg with China Road 
and Bridge Corporation serving as contractor. As Pinsent Masons comments, “The 
SGR presents a nearly ideal fit for the African component of China’s Belt-Road 
                                                          
37 Sander, Henny, and Rabinovitch, Simon. (August 8, 2013). “Chinese bank takes early step 
towards IPO.” Financial Times. 
38 Barboza, David. (January 23, 2012). “A Loophole Poses Risks to Investors in Chinese 
Companies.” The New York Times. 
39 Bradsher, Keith. (May 14, 2017). “U.S. Firms Want In on China’s global ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
Spending.” The New York Times. 
40 Pinsent Masons. (2016). “‘One Belt One Road’ Mapping China’s main outbound route. Pinsent 
Masons. London. http://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/insights/one-belt-one-road-mapping-chinas-
main-outbound-route. 
objectives…Construction of the line will create a strategic economic asset that 
further binds together the economies of East Africa internally and with the world 
beyond.”41 
  The most important OBOR country in Central Asia is Turkey, with 38 
infrastructure projects valued at $35 billion. The $28 billion Shah Deniz II gas field 
in Azerbaijan is another key development that will eventually link countries in an 
energy network bringing natural gas to China. Also proposed is a “Silk Road High-
Speed Railway” starting in Xinjiang and traveling to Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. All told there are 27 projects outside 
of Turkey with investments of about $52.5 billion.42 
 
Figure 1: Silk Road Economic Belt 
 
 
 
  In the Middle East Saudi Arabia and Qatar are planning huge projects, 
including building new cities and metro lines going into the tens of billions. Overall 
there are 125 ongoing and pending projects worth $445.5 billion. Egypt had the 
most projects with 30, and Iran with 18. China and Iran have particularly close 
relations with China having built roadways, industrial capacity, and purchasing oil 
during the US boycott. When sanctions were lifted Xi was the first foreign leader 
to go to Tehran, signing 17 new deals. China is also well situated in Qatar’s $225 
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billion development plans, holding a number of engineering and water construction 
contracts.43 
  Eastern Europe is the furthest western region of the OBOR venture. Poland is 
seen as a logistical hub with seaports at Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and 
Swinoujscie, as well as adding routes to its transcontinental railway. In Eastern 
Europe there are 80 projects in the infrastructure pipeline, but almost half of these 
are pending. Of reporting investments, the total is $25.3 billion.44 
  Russia has turned to China as a strategic economic partner, with OBOR as an 
important feature. The biggest project is the massive Power of Siberia gas pipeline 
whose investment calls for $55 billion. This is a joint venture between Gazprom 
and the China National Petroleum Corporation, although Gazprom may turn to 
Rosneft to raise the necessary funds. Another key project is the Moscow-Kazan 
high speed rail link cost $16.4 billion. Russia has 35 infrastructure works under 
construction reaching total investments of $127 billion.45 
  OBOR plans for South Asia include most importantly India and Pakistan. In 
2015 India and China signed more than $22 billion in trade and economic 
agreements, many of which will play well with OBOR. India has 213 new and up-
coming infrastructure projects worth $83.6 billion. With India's GDP only one-fifth 
of China it needs serious investments in roads, rail, and airports. Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have 20 projects underway, but Pakistan is the main 
beneficiary with $46 billion in OBOR related projects. One of the first loans was 
for the Thar Block II coal mine for a total of $1.2 billion.46 Although China has 
become a world leader in sustainable energy, since 2013 it has tripled its 
involvement in coal projects in OBOR countries. 
  Lastly is South East Asia, these countries are involved in 130 projects with 
investments of $250 billion in value. The top project is high-speed rail connecting 
Kuala Lumpur with Singapore. Other rail plans will link China with Cambodia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam tying all into a 
regional network. The four biggest projects are all in transportation. The largest is 
the Trans-Sumatra Toll Road in Indonesia for $27.7 billion, followed by the Sunda 
Strait Bridge also in Indonesia for $24 billion, the Ho Chi Minh City Metro System 
Master Plan for $23 billion, and for $21 billion the Cross Island Line in Singapore.47  
  OBOR is an opening for all TNCs including those headquartered in the US 
and EU. In September 2017 Krane Funds Advisors, a US asset management firm 
known for its China exchange-traded funds (ETFs), announced the launch of the 
KraneShares MSCI One Belt One Road ETF. Listed on the New York Stock 
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Exchange, the OBOR ETF holds strategic companies from participating OBOR 
countries. It’s weighted to included enterprises from China at 44 percent, Singapore 
10 percent, Malaysia 8 percent, Israel 6 percent, Russia 6 percent, Thailand 5 
percent, Philippines 5 percent, India 4 percent and Poland 4 percent. Sector tilts 
include those expected to grow under OBOR with industrials at 40 percent, 
materials 24 percent, utilities 16 percent, energy 11 percent and financials at 9 
percent. Noting the trillions to be invested over the next decade, CEO Jonathan 
Krane stated, “We believe the OBOR initiative is creating a new paradigm in global 
investing.”48 Under that new paradigm Krane hopes a good portion of those trillions 
will pour into and through KraneShares from TCC investors around the globe. Like 
BlackRock, KraneShares organizes capital flows into circuits of transnational 
accumulation, in this case helping to direct global capital into the OBOR project. 
  Doing further analysis we see KraneShares has ties to transnational financial 
networks that are even denser. In July 2017 China International Capital Corporation 
(CICC) acquired a majority stake in Krane Funds Advisors. CICC is one of China’s 
most important financial TNCs. Founded in 1995 by China Construction Bank and 
Morgan Stanley, its shareholders include the China Sovereign Wealth Fund (CIC), 
a Singapore Sovereign Wealth Fund GIC, and the giant US private equity firms 
TPG and KKR. As noted by CICC Acting Chairman and CEO Mingjian Bi, “We 
are a Chinese investment bank with unique international DNA.”49 Indeed, the 
Chinese private and state sector TCC is well integrated with their counterparts in 
the US.  
  In terms of US-headquartered transnationals GE, which already operates 34 
Chinese joint ventures worth $8 billion in revenue per year, appears to be a big 
winner. GE obtained OBOR orders of $2.3 billion in 2016, and is bidding for 
another $7 billion in 2017. It also sold $400 million worth of engineering equipment 
to TNCs involved in OBOR activities. HP, a logistics and freight transportation 
company, helped establish the China-Europe rail service connecting 16 cities in 
China to 15 cities in Europe.50 Getting into the action Caterpillar has built one of 
the world’s largest construction machinery factories in Xuzhou. And the New York 
Times notes, “Western companies are angling aggressively for a piece of the action. 
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Citibank won a contract from Bank of China to handle a complex $3 billion bond 
offering last month to raise money for opening branches across Asia, Eastern 
Europe and East Africa.”51 
 
Conclusion 
 
All the above changes point to one underlying significant shift. The Chinese state 
is now taking a leading role in organizing global capitalism. No longer only a 
recipient for FDI, but a major exporter of capital, organizing trading pacts and 
transnational financial institutions, as well as providing an economic vision for the 
future. Although conflict over governance issues continues between Chinese and 
US state elites, the TCC and their corporations are more than happy to participate. 
In this sense, it's impossible to locate an exclusive US economic "empire."  
 But as China’s TCC helps to guide the global economy, it’s doubtful they 
can avoid capitalism’s cyclical crisis. Six African megaprojects have already been 
canceled, and the $100 billion Inga Hydropower Project on the Congo River is on 
indefinite hold. High-risk, low-return projects are a major reason why Western 
TNCs have been tepid in their support of infrastructure building, and the same 
debate is now on-going in China. China’s need to export accumulated capital and 
overproduced goods can easily lead to an overstretched and debt-laden economy. 
Additionally, the environmental crisis grows more severe. The structural demands 
of OBOR will mean more energy burnt, more resources used, more pollution in our 
oceans and more carbon dioxide in our atmosphere. The onrushing troubles of 
climate change will pose serious obstacles to such a massive extension of global 
capitalism. 
  So far Chinese state elites have been able to guide their economy successfully 
past the global crisis of 2007 and into a world leading position. But with trillions 
of dollars invested outside of China the national and global economies are 
inexorably linked. As fast as capital leaps borders, in its tailwind comes bankruptcy 
and crisis. Just how the Chinese TCC and the Chinese working class reacts, may 
well determine the future of global capitalism. As strange as it seems, the Chinese 
Communist Party may have the fate of capitalism in its hands. 
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